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The Five Presidents’ Report presents a range of actions to complete Europe’s Economic and 
Monetary Union. This article examines whether the Five Presidents’ Report will lead to significant 
beneficial reforms, having regard to the European sovereign debt crisis and the legal framework of 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The article discusses the background to the production of 
the Five Presidents’ Report, including how preceding reports responded to the European sovereign 
debt crisis. The proposals to create a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), European Fiscal 
Board (EFB) and a Eurozone Treasury are focussed upon in this article. The article concludes that 
the measures proposed in the report do not go far enough towards establishing financial stability in 
the Eurozone. A key criticism is that counter-cyclical policy has not been the focus of the report’s 
recommendations on fiscal matters. 
Keywords: European Union, Economic and Monetary Union, Deposit Insurance Scheme, Fiscal 
Board, Treasury 
Introduction 
The ‘Five Presidents’ Report’, released in June 2015, presents a range of actions to 
complete ‘Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’.1 The report was prepared by the 
President of the European Commission, in close co-operation with the Presidents of 
the Euro Summit, Eurogroup, European Central Bank (ECB) and the European 
Parliament.2 It is the vision of the report that the measures proposed will provide the 
citizens of the Eurozone a ‘stable and prosperous place’ that is also attractive for 
other European Union (EU) member states to join if they are ready to do so.3  
The aim of this essay is to assess whether the Five Presidents’ Report will lead to 
significant beneficial reforms, having regard to the European sovereign debt crisis 
and the legal framework of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The first 
section of this essay details the background to the production of the Five Presidents’ 
Report, including how preceding reports responded to the European sovereign debt 
																																																								
1 Jean-Claude Juncker et al, Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (22 June 2015). 
2 Ibid, Juncker et al, 2015, p.2. 
3 Ibid, Juncker et al, 2015, p.5. 
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crisis. The second section of this essay will analyse three of the more contentious 
actions that have been proposed. The proposals to create a European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme (EDIS), European Fiscal Board (EFB) and a Eurozone Treasury 
will be analysed. The final section of this paper presents an overall assessment of the 
Five Presidents’ Report, including whether actions are absent from the report that 
should have been included. 
It is submitted that the measures proposed in the Five Presidents’ Report do not go 
far enough towards restructuring the legal framework of the EMU to ensure that 
financial stability in the Eurozone is maintained. In particular, a key criticism of the 
report is that counter-cyclical policy has not been the focus of the report’s 
recommendations on fiscal matters. However, given the likely opposition of 
countries, such as Germany, towards measures that transfer sovereignty to the EU, 
the report’s measured approach at least provides some momentum towards the 
process of reforming the economic architecture of the Eurozone. 
The European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
In October 2009, almost two years after the commencement of the global financial 
crisis, the newly elected Greek Government announced a revised national budget 
deficit of 12.7 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The revised figure was 
over double the 6.0 per cent of GDP deficit that had been estimated by the previous 
government. 4  This event marked the beginning of the European sovereign debt 
crisis.5 Greece’s fiscal accounts for previous years were also revised and demonstrated 
that Greece’s previous annual deficits were also significantly larger than had been 
reported6. The revelation that Greece had manipulated its budgetary figures in 2001 
upon its accession to the Eurozone played an important role in the political narrative 
of the European sovereign debt crisis at that time7. The primary blame for the crisis 
was placed upon the fiscal irresponsibility of those nations, such as Greece, who 
experienced the greatest impacts8. 
It is submitted that underlying financial and macroeconomic imbalances, rather than 
the irresponsibility of the Greek Government, were more significant factors behind 
the economic problems that plagued Greece9.  The global impact of the United States 
subprime mortgage market crisis was a major contributor to the deficit announced by 
the Greek Government in 200910. After 2007, the tax incomes of European nations 
plummeted, while additional spending was required by governments for bank 
bailouts, refinancing, stimulus packages and social security benefits for the 
unemployed.11  
In the spring of 2010, interest rates for Greek bonds rose to unsustainable levels, and 
it became apparent that Greece would lose access to market financing12. As Greece 
																																																								
4 Philip Lane, ‘The European Sovereign Debt Crisis’ (2012) 26 Journal of Economic Perspectives 49, 56. 
5 Christoph Herrmann, ‘Legal Aspects of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis’ 41 (2013) Hitotsubashi Journal of 
Law and Politics 25, p.26. 
6 Lane, 2012, above n 4, p.56. 
7 Herrmann, 2013, above n 5, p.26. 
8 Lane, 2012, above n 4, p.56. 
9 Ibid, Lane, 2012, p.56. 
10 Herrmann, 2013, above n 5, 26. 
11 Ibid, Hermann, 2013, p.26. 





was a Eurozone Member Nation, it did not have the option of printing money (and 
consequently devaluing its currency), in order to prevent default.13 While withdrawal 
from the Eurozone may have presented a potential option to re-establish monetary 
sovereignty, this action would have been legally troublesome. Whereas Article 50 of 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU) contains a never before implemented or 
invoked provision for a nation’s withdrawal from the EU, the treaties are silent on the 
subject of a state exiting the Eurozone14. It would also have been likely that extreme 
resistance would have been provided against such a move by other Eurozone nations, 
due to the potential impact such an action would have had upon the value of the 
euro15. 
A rescue package for Greece was subsequently implemented by the Eurozone 
Member States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which included 110 
billion euro of bilateral loans.16 The temporary European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF), which had an effective lending capacity of 440 billion euros, was an 
additional counter-crisis measure that was executed under international law. The 
European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM) was a response to the crisis 
instituted under European law that was based upon Article 122(2) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)17.   
Loans to Greece were made conditional upon the implementation of economic 
austerity and structural reform programs18. As the crisis spread to Cyprus, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain, demands were made on the crisis hit countries to lower wage 
costs, cut social services and implement privatisation19. There is a strong argument 
that the implementation of austerity and structural reform programs compromised 
the sovereignty of these crisis hit nations. 
Yanis Varoufakis, the Greek Minister for Finance from January to July 2015, has 
described the EFSF rescue package as ‘toxic’20. Varoufakis argued that the structure of 
the EFSF program ensured that every time a member state dropped out of the bond 
market, the burden imposed on ‘marginal member states’ would rise and the 
‘dynamic of contagion’ would be provided a fresh impetus21. The combination of the 
pro-cyclical austerity measures, with the rescue packages, Varoufakis concluded, 
pushed down the expected and actual GDP growth rates of impacted member states22.  
Process of Reform 
Following the spread of the sovereign debt crisis to Italy and Spain, where 
refinancing costs had skyrocketed, the view had developed that Europe would not be 
able to withstand the crisis through the readjustment of existing government 
																																																								
13 Herrmann, 2013, above n 5, p.26. 
14 Ibid, Hermann 2013, p.27. 
15 Ibid, Hermann 2013, p.27. 
16 Ibid, Hermann 2013, p.26. 
17 Council Regulation (EU) 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 Establishing a European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism 
[2010] OJ L 118/1. 
18 Herrmann, 2013, above n 5, p.27. 
19 Bjorn Hacker, On the Way to a Fiscal or a Stability Union? (December 2013) Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2. 
<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/10400.pdf> 
20 Yanis Varoufakis, ‘From Contagion to Incoherence Towards a model of the Unfolding Eurozone Crisis’ (2013) 
32 Contributions to Political Economy 51, p.57. 
21 Ibid, Varoufakis, 2013, p.63. 
22 Ibid, Varoufakis, 2013, p.65. 
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instruments23. The election of Francois Hollande as President of France in 2012, 
provided additional impetus to those, including the Italian Prime Minister, Mario 
Monti, who opposed the implementation of austerity measures in response to the 
crisis.24   At their meeting on 26 October 2011, the governments of the euro Member 
States asked the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, to identify 
possible steps to ‘strengthen the economic union to make it commensurate with the 
monetary union’. 25  It was requested that the report focus upon ‘strengthening 
economic convergence within the Eurozone, improving fiscal discipline’ and 
exploring ‘the possibility of limited Treaty changes’.26 The ‘Four Presidents’ Report’,27 
written by Van Rompuy, in consultation with the Presidents of the European 
Commission, Eurogroup and ECB was produced as a consequence of this request.28 
The appeal for the creation of the Four Presidents’ Report provided 
acknowledgement that the European sovereign debt crisis was not due solely to the 
transgressions of individual nations against European regulations.29  The source and 
spread of the European sovereign debt crisis has been recognised to be a 
consequence, at least in part, to the ‘flawed original design of the euro’.30 The fragility 
of the union under crisis was not understood and the incremental multi-country 
crisis management that was implemented as a reaction to the crisis was ‘messy’ and 
was a destabilising factor during the course of the crisis. 31  The secondary law 
responses, including the “European Semester’, the ‘Six-Pack’, the ‘Two-Pack’, the 
‘Euro-Plus Pact’ and the ‘Fiscal Compact’ could all be viewed as ‘piecemeal tinkering 
with the existing architecture of the Eurozone’32. 
Reports Leading up to the Four Presidents’ Report 
A number of reports were produced subsequent to October 2011, leading up to the 
publication of the final Four Presidents’ Reports in December 2012: 
In June 2012 Van Rompuy presented his first report for deepening European 
integration.33 The report proposed the implementation of a banking union that would 
be propped up by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 34  The report also 
discussed the need for a fiscal union with the option of joint issuing of debt 
securities. 35  The proposals for increasing ‘communisation’ met opposition from 
states, such as Finland, that backed the austerity policies supported by the German 
government’.36 
 In October 2012, Van Rompuy, presented an interim report, following 
individual talks with Member State governments and the President of the 
																																																								
23 Ibid, Hacker, 2013, p.2. 
24 Ibid, Hacker, 2013, p.2. 
25 Euro Summit, Euro Summit Statement (26 October 2011), 10 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/125644.pdf>. 
26 Ibid, Euro Summit, 2011, 10. 
27 Herman Van Rompuy et al, Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union (5 December 2012). 
28 Hacker, 2013, above n 19, 2. 
29 Ibid, Hacker, 2013, 2. 
30 Lane, 2012, above n 4, p.65. 
31 Ibid, Lane, 2012, p.65.  
32 Hacker, 2013, above n 19, 2. 
33 Herman Van Rompuy et al, Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union (26 June 2012).  
34 Van Rompuy et al, 2012, above n 33, pp.4-5; Hacker, 2013 above n 19, 3. 
35 Van Rompuy et al, 2012 above n 33, pp.5-6; Hacker, 2013 above n 19, 3. 





European Parliament.37 The proposal for a banking union was retained 
with the proviso that there must be more effective fiscal discipline to 
counter the moral hazard resulting from the taking over of the banking 
sector.38 A central budget was also proposed with which ‘a form of limited 
fiscal solidarity’ would be enabled through ‘elements of fiscal risk 
sharing’.39  
 On 28 November 2012, a ‘Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and 
Monetary Union’ was presented by the European Commission. 40  The 
Blueprint proposed that within six to18 months the banking union should 
be realised.41 Beyond 18 months to five years, further budgetary and fiscal 
policy coordination was proposed through a ‘proper fiscal capacity for the 
Eurozone, a redemption fund and the common issuance of short-term 
government debt (eurobills). 42  Beyond five years it was proposed that 
autonomous Eurozone budgeting should be established for the EMU that 
could absorb economic shocks and that ‘fiscal policy conditions for the 
common issuance of public debt’ (Eurobonds) should be implemented.43 
The Four Presidents’ Report 
The Four Presidents’ Report was presented at the meeting of the European Council 
on 13-14 December 2012.44 The report presented a ‘time bound three-stage plan’ to 
realise a ‘genuine EMU’. 45  The Four Presidents’ Report aimed to achieve closer 
integration in four principal areas including: 
 banking union;46 
 closer integration of budgetary policies, including a potential further 
budgetary capacity at the Eurozone level and a common debt instrument 
(eurobills);47 
 better coordination of economic policies other than fiscal policy;48 and 
 strengthening democratic legitimisation and accountability, potentially 
resulting in a degree of political union.49 
While the actions proposed in the Four Presidents’ Report were ambitious, significant 
progress was only made with proposed measures relating to the banking union.50 
Subsequent to the Four Presidents’ Report, agreements were made with regards to 
the: 
																																																								
37 Herman Van Rompuy et al, Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union: Interim Report (12 October 
2012). 
38 Van Rompuy et al, 2012, above n 37, 4-5; Hacker, 2013, above n 19, 4. 
39 Van Rompuy et al, 2012, above n 37, 4; Hacker, 2013, above n 19, 4. 
40 European Commission, A Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Debate, Launching a 
European Debate (28 November 2012). 
41 European Commission, 2012, above n 40, 12; Hacker, 2013, above n 19, 6. 
42 European Commission, 2012, above n 40, 12; Hacker, 2013, above n 19, 6. 
43 European Commission, 2012, above n 40, 12-13; Hacker, 2013, above n 19, 6. 
44 Hacker, 2013, above n 19, 6. 
45 Van Rompuy et al, 2012, above n 33, 2. 
46 Ibid, Van Rompuy et al, 2012, 5-8. 
47 Ibid, Van Rompuy et al, 2012, 8-12. 
48 Ibid, Van Rompuy et al, 2012, 13-16. 
49 Ibid, Van Rompuy et al, 2012, 16-17. 
50 Iain Begg, What does the Five Presidents’ Report mean for the Future of the Euro? (June 2015)The London 
School of Political Sciences <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/06/23/what-does-the-five-presidents-report-mean-for-
the-future-of-the-euro/>. 
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 prudential supervision of banks through the single supervisory mechanism 
(SSM); and  
 common approach to resolve failing banks via the single resolution 
mechanism (SRM).51 
It is submitted that the Four Presidents’ Report did not deliver upon the goal of 
strengthening the economic union to a level commensurate to the monetary union. 
The Four Presidents’ Report was not able to bring about a ‘clear commitment to the 
medium-term establishment of a fiscal union’. 52   The establishment of a fiscal 
capacity for the monetary union was scrapped at the summit meeting in December 
2012 due to opposition from a group of nations, including Germany, 53  The 
opportunity that was provided by the European sovereign debt crisis to implement 
the reforms necessary for a stable monetary union was not capitalised upon.54 
The Five Presidents’ Report 
The Five Presidents’ Report builds upon the earlier reports previously described and 
aims to achieve progress towards a deeper EMU on four fronts including a:  
 Genuine Economic Union that ensures that each economy within the 
Union possesses the structural features required to prosper within the 
Monetary Union;55 
 Financial Union that guarantees the integrity of the euro and increases 
risk-sharing with the private sector;56 
 Fiscal Union that provides fiscal sustainability and stabilisation;57  and 
 Political Union that provides a basis for progress on the above fronts 
through ‘democratic accountability, legitimacy and institutional 
strengthening’.58 
The aims of the Five Presidents’ Report are proposed to be accomplished in three 
stages: 
 Stage 1 measures, which are to be completed by 30 June 2017, are 
characterised as ‘immediate steps’.59 Actions are proposed that will boost 
‘competitiveness and structural convergence’, complete the Financial 
Union, achieve and maintain ‘responsible fiscal policies’ at the national and 
euro level and enhance democratic accountability.60 
 Stage 2 measures, which are to be completed by 2025 at the latest, are 
described as ‘concrete measures of a more far-reaching nature’ which 
would ‘complete the EMU’s economic and institutional architecture’.61  
																																																								
51 Ibid, Begg, 2015. 
52 Hacker, 2013, above n 19, 7. 
53 Ibid, Hacker, 2013, 7. 
54 Lane, 2012, above n 30, 68. 
55 Juncker et al, 2015, above n 1, 4. 
56 Ibid, Juncker et al, 2015, 4. 
57 Ibid, Juncker et al, 2015, 5. 
58 Ibid, Juncker et al, 2015, 5. 
59 Ibid, Juncker et al, 2015, 5. 
60 Ibid, Juncker et al, 2015, 5. 





 It is envisaged in the report that when the Final Stage is reached, ‘a deep 
and meaningful EMU would provide a stable and prosperous place’ for all 
the citizens of the EU member states that share the euro, and which would 
be attractive for other EU member states to join if they are ready to do so.62 
It is beyond the scope of this essay to analyse all of the measures proposed in the Five 
Presidents’ Report. The proposals to create a European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
(EDIS), a European Fiscal Board (EFB) and a Eurozone Treasury are analysed in the 
following sections. 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
The EDIS is described in the Five Presidents’ Report as the third pillar of a fully-
fledged banking union.63 The primary aim of the Banking Union is to ‘break the link 
between a Member State’s banks and its taxpayers’. 64 The Banking Union reforms 
seek to prevent a declining bank sector from jeopardising the sustainability of public 
debt or unsustainable public debt compromising an otherwise solvent bank sector.65 
As previously discussed, the first two pillars of the banking union, the SSM and the 
SRM have already been implemented to respectively provide a common framework 
for the supervision of banks and bank resolution. 
The aim of the EDIS is to provide a ‘stronger and more uniform degree of insurance 
cover for all retail depositors in the banking union’ such that a bank’s location should 
not determine the level of depositor confidence in that bank.66 As stated by Goyal et al 
of the IMF, losses of confidence can quickly flow ‘if a weak sovereign is perceived not 
to be able to honour its safety net obligations, triggering capital flight and deposit 
outflows’. 67  Deposit Guarantee Schemes are designed to limit the possibility of 
systemic bank runs.68 Deposits of up to €100,000 are already protected through 
National Deposit Guarantee Schemes (NDGS). 69  The Deposit Guarantee Scheme 
Directive 2014/49/EU requires all deposit-taking banks in the EU to be a member of 
a NDGS.70 However these NDGSs are considered to be vulnerable to large local 
shocks.71  
The United States is an example of a monetary union where private financial 
connections across state borders have helped to cushion regional economic impacts.72 
In smoothing the business cycle, private risk sharing across states has proven to be as 
important as fiscal risk sharing.73 However in the Eurozone, cross-border ownership 
																																																								
62 Ibid, Juncker et al, 2015, 5. 
63 Ibid, Juncker et al, 2015, 11. 
64 European Commission, Towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (9 November 2015) 1 
<http://ec.europa.eu/epsc/pdf/publications/5p_note_edis.pdf>. 
65 Ibid, European Commission, 2015, 1. 
66 Ibid, European Commission, 2015, 1. 
67 Goyal et al, A Banking Union for the Euro Area (February 2013) International Monetary Fund Staff Discussion 
Note, 19 < https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2013/sdn1301.pdf>. 
68 European Commission, 2015, above n 64, 1. 
69 Ibid, European Commission, 2015, 1. 
70 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes [2014] OJ L 173/49. 
71 European Commission, A European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) – Frequently Asked Questions, 3 (24 
November 2015) < http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6153_en.htm>. 
72 Christian Odenhall, The Eurozone’s ‘Five Presidents’ Report’: An Assessment (22 June 2015) Centre for 
European Reform < https://www.cer.org.uk/insights/eurozones-five-presidents-report-assesment>. 
73 Ibid, Odenhall, 2015. 
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and capital flows are underdeveloped which in turn means that private risk-sharing is 
underdeveloped.74 Additionally as banks as so closely tied to their regional economy 
and their sovereign, rather than being a stabilising factor, they can destabilise the 
government and the economy during an economic downturn.75 
The EDIS is proposed to be implemented over three stages.76 The first stage from 
2017 to 2019 is termed the reinsurance phase. In this stage a NDGS would only be 
able to access the EDIS after it has exhausted its own resources.77 In the co-insurance 
phase, which is designed to run from 2020-2023, participating NDGSs will be co-
insured by the EDIS.78 The co-insurance phase is different from the reinsurance 
phase in that funding is provided and loss is covered from the first euro deposited 
into an account.79  The share of the insurance coverage borne by the EDIS will 
gradually increase over the co-insurance period from 20 to 80 per cent. As of 2024, 
during the full insurance period, the participating NDGSs would be fully insured by 
the EDIS.80 
The EDIS proposal has garnered criticism from sources including Ludger 
Schuknecht, the chief economist of the German Federal Ministry of Finance, who 
stated that the EDIS is an ‘insurance scheme that only ensures problems’. 81 
Schuknecht has condemned the scheme for providing the wrong incentives to 
national-level politicians who could ‘suspend their insolvency regimes and asset 
seizure rules without being punished’.82 Schuknecht argues that as a consequence of 
the EDIS ‘other countries would soon be liable for the consequences of misguided 
domestic policies, without those countries being able to influence such behaviour’.83 
Schuknecht also argues that through the EDIS, ‘the door would be opened for further 
centralisation and mutualisation in Europe’.84  Schuknecht claims that it is ‘somewhat 
far-fetched to claim that the EDIS is connected to the internal market’.85 Article 114 of 
the TFEU provides that the European Parliament and the Council shall act ‘in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure… for the approximation of… 
provisions laid down by law… which have as their object the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market’.86 It is Schuknecht’s contention that the legal basis 
allows individual countries to be outvoted such that ‘supposed or actual unilateral 
burden-sharing can be forced through.87  
																																																								
74 Ibid, Odenhall, 2015. 
75 Ibid, Odenhall, 2015. 
76 European Parliament, European Deposit Insurance Scheme: Completing the Banking Union (14 March 2016), 
4 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2016)579090>. 
77 Ibid, European Parliament, 2016, 4. 
78 Ibid, European Parliament, 2016, 5,6.  
79 Ibid, European Parliament, 2016, 5,6. 
80 Ibid, European Parliament, 2016, 6. 
81 Ludger Schuknecht, ‘An Insurance Scheme That Only Ensures Problems’ Frankfurter Allgemeine (online) 8 
February 2016 < http://blogs.faz.net/fazit/2016/02/08/an-insurance-scheme-that-only-ensures-problems-7298/>. 
82 Ibid, Schuknecht, 2016. 
83 Ibid, Schuknecht, 2016. 
84 Ibid, Schuknecht, 2016. 
85 Ibid, Schuknecht, 2016. 
86 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, opened for signature 13 December 2007 (entered into force 1 
December 2009) art 114. 





Schuknecht also claims that the plans for the EDIS are ‘yet another sign of how little 
the subsidiary principle is taken seriously’.88 Article 5 of the Treaty on European 
Union established the principle of subsidiarity.89 Under the principle of subsidiarity: 
in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if 
and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States…but can be better achieved at Union Level.90  
However, it is noted that the internal market legal basis was used for the approval of 
the SRM Regulation in 2014. 91  Schuknecht’s argument would appear to be 
contradicted by Germany’s earlier support of the SRM. 
There are other flaws in the argument put forward by Schuknecht. The EDIS will not 
present the level of moral hazard that Schuknecht suggests that it will pose. As the 
EDIS will only guarantee deposits up to a limit of €100,000, it is unlikely that a 
government would want to trigger a bank failure.92 As conceded by Schuknecht the 
EDIS would mean that ‘central banks would not have to jump in with emergency 
liquidity assistance quite as quickly’ which should impose more discipline on bank 
creditors and policymakers.93  
It is submitted that the proposal in the Five Presidents’ Report to complete the 
banking union by way of the EDIS is an ambitious goal that should be admired. As 
argued by Goyal et al, without the EDIS, ‘the banking union would remain an 
incomplete and risky construct that fails to delink the funding costs of weak 
sovereigns from that of their banks’.94 The EDIS is a crucial step in the process of de-
coupling banks from their sovereign, ensuring that banks and capital markets are 
diversified across the monetary union and that the monetary union is more 
resilient. 95  The approval of the SRM Regulation in 2014 demonstrates that the 
internal market legal basis is appropriate for the implementation of the EDIS. 
European Fiscal Board 
The Five Presidents’ Report highlighted that one of the main lessons of the European 
sovereign debt crisis was that ‘fiscal policies are a matter of vital common interest in 
a Monetary Union’.96 It is noted that in the past twenty years, the average ratio of 
public debt to GDP in the Eurozone has risen from 70 per cent before the crisis to 90 
per cent in 2016.97 Consequently there is a greater likelihood today that a problem in 
one Member State could spill over to other nations.98 If the overall direction of fiscal 
policy for the entire Eurozone is not suitable, Member States may still suffer in spite 
of their own responsible fiscal policies.99 
																																																								
88 Ibid, Schuknecht, 2016. 
89 Treaty on European Union, opened for signature 7 February 1992 (entered into force 1 November 1993) art 5. 
90 Ibid, Treaty on European Union, art 5. 
91 Nicolas Veron, European Deposit Insurance: A Response to Ludger Schuknecht (16 February 2016) Bruegel 
<http://bruegel.org/2016/02/european-deposit-insurance-a-response-to-ludger-schuknecht/>. 
92 Ibid, Veron, 2016. 
93 Ibid, Veron, 2016.  
94 Goyal et al, 2013, above n 67, 19. 
95 Odenhall, 2015, above n 72. 
96 Juncker et al, 2015, above n 1, 14. 
97 European Commission, Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union: An Advisory European Fiscal 
Board (2016) 1 <https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/factsheet-efb_en.pdf>. 
98 Ibid, European Commission, 2016, 1. 
99 Ibid, European Commission, 2016, 1. 
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Articles 2(3), 3, 4 and 5 of the TFEU dictate that Member States are responsible for 
the formulation and execution of economic and fiscal policies. Additionally, Articles 
119, 120 and 121 of the TFEU provide a mechanism for the positive integration of the 
various Member State fiscal policies. Under Article 121 the performance of Member 
States is monitored by the Commission, which then reports to the Council. Article 126 
of the TFEU dictates the sanctions that apply when a Member State violates the rules 
relating to sustainable public finances. 
The two main objectives of the European fiscal framework are: 
 to discourage the deficit bias of governments such that the long-term 
sustainability of public debt is ensured; and 
 to enable counter-cyclical fiscal policy.100 
With regards to the second objective, researchers including Barbiero and Darvas,101 
have concluded that the fiscal stance taken since 2012 has been too restrictive given 
the economic situation in the Eurozone.102 In a recession, undue fiscal consolidation, 
through such means as austerity measures, can prolong economic weaknesses, keep 
the debt ratio high and trigger further fiscal consolidation.103  
It is against this backdrop, in line with the recommendations contained in the Five 
Presidents’ Report, the EFB will be put into operation by the European Commission 
as an ‘advisory body on the overall direction of fiscal policy’ in the Eurozone.104 The 
Commission has stated that the EFB is to be composed of ‘five renowned 
international experts with credible competence and experience in macroeconomics 
and practical budgetary policy-making’. 105  The EFB will act as an ‘independent 
evaluator of how the EU’s fiscal framework is being implemented’ and will ‘feed’ into 
the Commission’s work of monitoring the enforcement of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP).106 It will not be the role of the EFB to replace national fiscal councils, 
which are a requirement of the two-pack legislation, or to duplicate the Commission’s 
work on applying the SGP.107 
The European Commission’s proposal for the creation of the EFB has proven to be 
controversial. The Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem and the German finance 
minister, Wolfgang Schauble, have criticised the Commission’s plans for the EFB.108 
Dijsselbloem has argued that the EFB’s set up does not have an adequate level of 
independence.109 Schauble has stated that the EFB should not be an advisory body, 
but should be the ultimate decision-maker on national budgets.110  It is submitted 
that the views of Dijsselbloem and Schauble are of merit and that the EFB will not 
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have enough power or independence to make significant progress towards achieving 
both objectives of the European fiscal framework.  
It is put forward that the EFB is likely to be viewed in the same light as the European 
Commission, which may diminish the regard that is given to the EFB’s 
recommendations. As argued by Mody, the political process undermines the proper 
application of any fiscal policy.111  Currently there is a perception amongst some 
stakeholders that the European Commission does not always provide unbiased 
recommendations to the Council.112 Although Article 4 of the Commission’s decision 
to establish the EFB states that the ‘EFB shall act independently’,113 the role of the 
EFB is advisory and the nomination of members depends almost entirely upon the 
Commission.114   
The lack of transparency regarding the reasoning behind the advice provided by the 
EFB is also a cause of concern.115 Article 6 of the Commission’s decision to establish 
the EFB states that the EFB is only required to publish one annual report.116 It is 
submitted that the EFB would gain more legitimacy if it is required to publish the 
justification for its advice at much shorter intervals.  
A truly independent body should be given the duty to implement the objectives of the 
European fiscal framework. The creation of the EFB may help to ensure that existing 
fiscal rules are followed that aim to achieve long-term public debt sustainability. 
However, it is doubtful whether the EFB will have enough independence and power 
to make meaningful progress towards the counter-cyclical fiscal policy objective, 
where reforms may be required that do not conform with current practices. It is 
submitted that Article 121 of the TFEU needs to be amended such that the EFB takes 
on the role of monitoring and reports directly to the Council, rather than through the 
Commission.  
Eurozone Treasury 
The Five Presidents’ Report states that ‘as the Eurozone evolves towards a genuine 
EMU, some decisions will increasingly need to be made collectively’.117 The report 
asserts that more joint decision-making on fiscal policy will be required for a genuine 
Fiscal Union.118 A future Eurozone Treasury is proposed as a place for such collective 
decision making.119 However the report emphasises that Eurozone Member States 
would continue to be responsible for making decisions on taxation and the allocation 
of budgetary expenditures according to their preferences and political choices.120  
																																																								
111 Ashoka Mody, Are the Eurozone’s Fiscal Rules Dying? (29 October 2014) Bruegel 
<http://bruegel.org/2014/10/are-the-eurozones-fiscal-rules-dying/>. 
112 Claeys et al, 2016, above n 100, 15. 
113 Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1937 of 21 October 2015 on Establishing an Independent Advisory European 
Fiscal Board [2015] OJ L 282/37 art 4. 
114 Claeys et al, 2016, above n 100, 16. 
115 Ibid. Claeys et al, 2016, 16. 
116 Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1937 of 21 October 2015 on Establishing an Independent Advisory European 
Fiscal Board [2015] OJ L 282/37 art 6. 
117 Juncker et al, 2015, above n 1, 18. 
118 Ibid, Juncker et al, 2015, 18. 
119 Ibid, Juncker et al, 2015, 18. 
120 Ibid, Juncker et al, 2015, 18. 
Whiteman, ANZJES 8(2) 
 
108 
The push to form a Eurozone Treasury has been supported by two of Europe’s most 
powerful central bankers.121 Jens Weidmann, president of the Deutsche Bundesbank, 
and Francois Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, have urged the 19 
Member States of the Eurozone to move towards a ‘comprehensive sharing of 
sovereignty’ which would include a 19 member treasury.122 The pair stated that ‘while 
monetary policy has delivered a lot of support for the Eurozone economy, it cannot 
bring about long-lasting economic growth’.123 They argued that ‘more integration 
appears to be the most straightforward solution to restore confidence in the 
Eurozone’.124  
The comments are a rare demonstration of unity from leading French and German 
figures, nations that have often diverged regarding their visions for the Eurozone.125 
Germany has for a long time advocated that budgetary discipline is at the heart of a 
fiscal union.126  In contrast, France has supported a more flexible investment-led 
approach where the creation of new institutions is prioritised to bolster 
governance.127 It is noted, however, that efforts to create a Eurozone Treasury will 
likely be resisted by those countries that oppose transferring more sovereignty to EU 
institutions.128  
The French Economy Minister, Emmanuel Macron, supports the creation of a 
common treasury which would be overseen by a separate Eurozone parliament’.129 
The French Minister argued that ‘if we don’t move forward, we decide for dismantling 
the Eurozone’.130 Macron stated that he would like a common Eurozone Treasury to 
be set up by member states with a single finance minister.131 Contributions would 
then be made by Member States through part of their VAT receipts and 
unemployment insurance to fund transfers, with a Eurozone parliament acting as a 
political check. 132  Macron has expressed scepticism that the Five Presidents’ 
recommendation for a Eurozone Treasury will lead to any concrete action.133  
It is submitted that too little focus was placed upon the formation of a Eurozone 
Treasury in the Five Presidents’ Report. While the report flagged the creation of a 
Eurozone Treasury, it did not provide any detail about how this aim could be 
achieved and what treaty reforms would be required.134 There should have been a 
commitment in the report to at least have an expert group look into the design and 
legal requirements for a Eurozone treasury.135 
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Overall Assessment of the Five Presidents’ Report 
The actions proposed in the Five Presidents’ Report are less ambitious than those 
proposed in the Four Presidents Report.136 Given the failure of the Four Presidents 
Report to lead to concrete actions, other than the SSM and the SRM, this was 
probably a calculated move. In light of the advances made from the Four Presidents’ 
Report with regards to the banking union, the proposal in the Five Presidents’ Report 
to complete the banking union through the implementation of an EDIS is considered 
to be a positive step to break the link between banks and sovereigns. However, given 
Germany’s opposition to the scheme, it would appear to be a difficult path ahead for 
such a scheme to be implemented. 
The Five Presidents’ Report fails to accept and push the debate regarding the 
necessity for treaty change.137 The report, consequently does not honour the mandate 
that was originally provided to Van Rompuy in October 2011 to explore the possibility 
of treaty change. The report does not acknowledge for which of its proposed actions 
treaty amendments will be required. In contrast, the European Commission’s 
Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine EMU of 2012 clearly described for which of its 
proposed actions treaty amendments would be required.138 
The Five Presidents Report should have placed counter-cyclical policy at the centre of 
its recommendations on fiscal matters, and urged policy-makers to review the 
Eurozone’s current fiscal rules.139 It is acknowledged that the report recognises that 
fiscal policy needs to be set counter-cyclically at the national and Eurozone level.140 
However, rather than placing an emphasis on counter-cyclical policy, actions in the 
report are focussed upon strengthening existing fiscal rules aimed at debt 
reduction.141‘  
The ECB’s role as a lender of last resort is not mentioned in the Five Presidents’ 
Report. Given the controversial nature of this subject in countries such as Germany, 
and the success of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program, the absence 
of this subject from the Five Presidents’ Report is not of concern.142 
Conclusion 
The European sovereign debt crisis exposed the fragility of the Eurozone. While the 
Five Presidents’ Report aims to prevent a similar crisis from occurring in the future, 
it is submitted that the measures proposed do not go far enough towards establishing 
financial stability in the Eurozone. In particular, a key criticism of the report has been 
that counter-cyclical policy has not been the focus of the report’s recommendations 
on fiscal matters. Ideally, the report should have presented a clear road map 
regarding what legal reforms are necessary to ensure the financial stability of the 
EMU. The consequence of the limited success of the Four Presidents’ Report to 
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deliver upon its mandate has resulted in the Five Presidents’ Report being less 
ambitious in the actions it has proposed compared to its predecessor reports.  
With regards to those proposed actions that have been analysed in this essay it is 
submitted that: 
 the EDIS is an ambitious proposal, which should be supported. The EDIS is 
a crucial step in the process of de-coupling banks from their sovereign, 
ensuring that banks and capital markets are diversified across the 
monetary union and that the monetary union is more resilient. The 
approval of the SRM Regulation in 2014 demonstrates that the internal 
market legal basis is appropriate for the implementation of the EDIS. 
 the creation of the EFB should help to ensure that existing fiscal rules are 
followed that aim to achieve long-term public debt sustainability. However, 
it is doubtful whether the EFB will have enough independence and power 
to make meaningful progress towards the counter-cyclical fiscal policy 
objective. It is submitted that Article 121 of the TFEU needs to be amended 
such that the EFB reports directly to the Council, rather than through the 
Commission. The reasoning behind the advice provided by the EFB should 
also be clear, transparent and reported to the public on a regular basis. 
 a Eurozone Treasury is one means by which further integration and growth 
could be accomplished for the Eurozone. A future Eurozone Treasury 
would provide an avenue for joint decision making by the member states 
on fiscal policy. However not enough attention was focussed upon the legal 
reforms required to progress this initiative in the Five Presidents’ Report. 
In light of the European sovereign debt crisis, an opportunity was again missed by the 
Five Presidents’ Report to bring about significant reform. However, it is recognised 
that a number of countries, including Germany, will oppose proposals that result in 
the transfer of power to EU institutions. This will likely be demonstrated with regards 
to the proposed implementation of the EDIS. Consequently, the measured approach 
taken in the Five Presidents’ Report can be accepted as a strategic decision made to 
maintain momentum towards reforming the economic architecture of the Eurozone. 
  
